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Keynote Address 
Urban Health and the Social Contract: Poverty, Race, and Death 
H. Jack Geiger, MD' 
For more than three decades our nation has been concemed about a health care crisis; those three words are now almost 
a part of our national culture. The reasons for the prolonged and 
intense discussion on the health care crisis are well known, and 
there is no need to review them in great detail at the outset. We 
all have heard repeatedly about the inexorably rising share ofthe 
gross national product (GNP) that is consumed by the health 
care sy.stem. We all have heard about the millions of uninsured 
and underinsured. We know the staggering amounts of total 
health care spending; $604 billion in 1989, or $2,354 per per-
son—40% greater than the per capita expenditure in Canada and 
double the mean ofthe 24 industrialized countries in the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development. U.S. 
Budget Director Richard Darman estimates that, at the present 
rate, total public and private spending for health care will con-
sume 17% of our GNP by the year 2000 and 37%—more than 
one-third of our total economy—by 2030 (1). 
Cost is only one of the issues. We all have heard the stories of 
care curtailed or denied and of patients who have delayed even 
seeking care—something that happens 12 times more fre-
quently among the poor and uninsured (2). We all know the con-
sequences in morbidity and mortality. 
Similarly, almost everyone by now is familiar with the usual 
roster of assigned villains; an open-ended insurance system with 
huge administrative costs and a nightmare of documentation re-
quirements for patients and providers alike; the uninhibited in-
troduction of new technologies, whether or not they are cleariy 
beneficial or cost-effective; the increasing health burden of 
an aging population; acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) and substance abuse epidemics; the maldistribution of 
health care resources; unrealistic expectations on the part of pa-
tients; malpractice suits; medical greed. The list is endless. 
There is ample evidence against each of the accu.sed. For exam-
ple, in a recent newspaper report (3) on the proliferation of 
hugely expensive magnetic resonance imaging machines owned 
by networks of physicians with a financial motivation to refer 
the maximum possible number of patients, the physician/inves-
tor in an imaging center in Atianta was quoted as saying, "tf 
there's more profit in it, what's wrong with that? ...This is an 
entrepreneurial society." 
What is relatively more recent, after decades of this debate, is 
the emergence of urban health care as the most acute and dan-
gerous component of the national crisis. Again, we tend to focus 
first on cost. The nation's IOO public hospitals, which are the 
only real form of "national health insurance" in metropolitan ar-
eas, have an average annual deficit of $9 million. Bad debts and 
charity care account for 42% of their charges, and 30% of their 
inpatient days and 52% of their outpatient visits are by unin-
sured patients (4). In Chicago, the newest public hospital bed 
was opened in 1925. Public hospitals are in critical condition, 
made worse by the inadequacy in coverage and in reimburse-
ment rates of Medicaid, which also deprives the poor of access 
to private physicians. 
In a Community Service Society study (5) of nine tow-in-
come minority communities in New York City, only 28 primary 
care physicians had hospital privileges and were fully accessible 
to the 1.7 million residents in those areas. One ofthe most de-
prived areas was central Harlem, which in 1985 had a death rate 
87% higher than the New York City average. The study noted: 
"The main victims in Harlem are working age adults. 
Compared to New York City as a whole, the death rate for 
people aged 15-44 in Hariem was 240 percent higher; for 
those 44-65 of age, it was 128 percent higher. These were 
not deaths that arose from violence and drugs: the leading 
killers in Harlem were cancer, heart attack, hypertensive 
disease, pneumonia, diabetes, bronchitis. Not coinciden-
tally, this is the same community that is documented here 
to have four fully functioning physicians to provide basic 
health care for its 214,000 inhabitants." 
That survey included health districts with an infant mortality 
rate of 69.9 per 1,000 live births, about the same as Kenya's. For 
every infant death, approximately 100 babies are bom with low 
birthweight, or addicted to drugs, or suffering from congenital 
anomalies or other conditions, many of them preventable. 
The inner cities, in short, are islands of illness and premature 
death within the larger society, suffering epidemics of AIDS, tu-
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berculosis, hepatitis A, syphilis, gonorrhea, measles, compli-
cated ear infections, and lung cancer. McCord and Freeman (6), 
whose survival analysis of age-adjusted mortality rates found 
that black men in Harlem are less likely to reach the age of 65 
than men in Bangladesh, identified 53 other health districts in 
New York City—they called them "natural-disaster areas"—in 
which mortality rates for the < 65 age group were at least twice 
the expected rates. Death comes sooner—and after inadequate 
treatment—from cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. These are 
sentinel events, indicators not merely of the crumbling of the ur-
ban health care system but of larger changes in our society. 
Before discussing those changes, I should note one factor that 
has remained distressingly constant; the rhetoric of reform. 
JAMA may devote an entire issue to a wide spectrum of propos-
als, ranging from the American Medical Association's own 
ideas to the proposals of the Physicians for a National Health 
Program, but political statements continue to be bland. Consider 
a recent comment by George Mitchell, the majority leader of the 
U.S. Senate; "The Congress and the Administration must pro-
vide leadership and insurance reform, cost containment strate-
gies and expanded coverages for the poor and the elderly, for 
both the public and the private sector." But Daniel Greenberg, 
writing from Washington for a British medical joumai (7), 
noted; 
"The rhetoric of crisis is intense, but the pressure for 
change is not focused. Meanwhile, the prospering health 
care industry is at the ramparts to protect its good fortune. 
The most informed, politically concemed elements of the 
population know about the failings of the system mainly 
from second-hand reports rather than personal experi-
ence... the despairing critiques of the health care system 
are familiar, and so is the likelihood that major reforms 
and access and cost containment will conrinue to prove 
elusive." 
The long and dismal history of failure to introduce fundamen-
tal change, at least since the reforms of 1965, is one reason for 
some pessimism. There is, however, a deeper reason, and it con-
stitutes my central theme, 
I submit that any hope of truly reforming the American health 
care system is illusory without first, or at least simultaneously, 
effecting a fundamental change in our overall national social, 
economic, and racial policies, the set of understandings as to the 
responsibilities and limits of govemment that we call a social 
contract, t submit that we cannot, we wilt not, transform one part 
of that social contract in isolation from all the others, even a part 
as huge, as flawed, and as important as health care without con-
fronting the need for broader social change. That, in tum, re-
quires us to confront the barriers to such social change, to under-
stand what has been happening to the social contract over the 
last 20 years, and how, in the main, that was accomplished. 
These recent changes comprise the most significant redefinition 
ofthe social contract since the innovations ofthe 1960s, which 
were in turn the biggest changes since the 1930s and the New 
Deal. 
These changes of the 1980s—not the health care system per 
se—bear major responsibility for the desperate problems we 
now confront in the health status of many of our populations. 
These changes in the social contract have been documented in 
exquisite detail by the Congressional Budget Office and pub-
lished by the House Committee on Ways and Means, and many 
of the following data on income shifts are drawn from that 
source (8). The changes ofthe t980s include: 
1. The redistribution of wealth upwards to those in the top 
20% of family incomes, and within that group, most intensely, 
to the top 1%. 
The inner cities are islands of illness and pre-
mature death within the larger society... Death 
comes sooner — and after inadequate treat-
ment —from cancer, heart disease, and dia-
betes. These are sentinel events, indicators not 
merely of the crumbling of the urban health 
care system but of larger changes in our so-
ciety. 
2. The redistribution of both income and opportunity away 
from the middle class and the poor, an effort directed most in-
tensely at the bottom 20%, those at or below 150%> of the so-
called poverty line. 
3. The deliberate erosion—in some sectors, the destruction— 
of govemmental responsibility and support for assistance in 
housing, education, nutrition, environmental protection, the cre-
ation of employment opportunities, and, not least, health care. In 
my own state of New York, for example, with its long record of 
innovation and leadership in the development of low-income 
public housing, only one project that might qualify for inclusion 
in that category is planned for 1992: the building of 3,000 new 
jail cells. 
4. The virtual abandonment of federal support for cities, in di-
rect proportion, I believe, to the concentrations of the poor and, 
above all, of blacks and Hispanics in urban centers, so that for a 
decade our cities have steadily and increasingly grown more 
black, brown, and broke. 
5. The widespread acceptance of the belief that it is govem-
ment itself, together with the poor and minorities themselves, 
that are the cau.se of our economic and social difficulties. Thus, 
those whom we once regarded as the victims of an inequitable 
society are now presented to us as the cause of inequity, espe-
cially as inequity is perceived by a struggling middle class. 
There has been constructed for us a new social entity, the "black 
underclass," in terms that emphasize personal behaviors (9) and 
ignore massive changes in the labor market and huge inequali-
ties in educational spending, as a way of defining and explaining 
the growing class polarization of American society (10.11). 
These changes—in both policies and beliefs—were the result 
of a sustained political effort, one that is ongoing still. The very 
core of that effort, I suggest, is the deliberate attempt to deepen 
the racial fault line that has always existed in American social, 
economic, and political life. We are told that our national diffi-
culties are due to the behaviors of (and the special privileges al-
legedly afforded to) minorities, and that the only vestige of ra-
cism we now confront is affirmative action itself. (This in a na-
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tion in which a 1990 survey conducted by the National Opinion 
Research Center [12] at the University of Chicago found that a 
majority of whites—on some questions, as high as 78%—be-
lieve blacks and Hispanics prefer welfare to hard work, tend to 
be lazy, are more prone to violence, less intelligent than whites, 
and are less patriotic!) 
Let me present some statistics on some of the dimensions of 
these changes, drawn mostly from Congressional Budget Office 
data (which, for technical reasons, are substantially more accu-
rate than Bureau of the Census analyses) and summarized re-
cently by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (13); 
From 1977 to 1988, the average after-tax income of the poor-
est fifth of households fell 10%, after adjusting for inflation. 
The middle fifth of households experienced an average after-
tax income gain of less than 4% over this period. The share of 
the national income going to the middle class—the 60% of U.S. 
households in the middle of the income spectrum—received 
50.6% of att after-tax income in 1977; by 1988, its share had 
dropped to 46.3%. 
By contrast, the top fifth of households realized an average 
gain in after-tax income of 34%. In 1988, the wealthiest one-
fifth of the population received as much after-tax income as the 
other 80% of the population combined. 
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities also points out 
that the average after-tax income of the richest 1 % of Americans 
more than doubled from 1977 to 1988, rising 122% after adjust-
ing for inflation, from $203,000 in 1977 to $451,000 in 1988. In 
other words, the richest 1% (2.5 million Americans) now have 
neariy as much income as the bottom 40% combined (100 mil-
lion Americans with the lowest incomes). 
These changes, while due mainly to increa.sed disparities in 
before-tax incomes, were exacerbated by changes in federal tax 
policies; since 1977, the richest Americans have received large 
tax reductions, while middle-income Americans have not. Be-
tween 1977 and 1992 (allowing for the impact of tax provisions 
in the 1991 budget agreement), the effective tax rate—that is, 
the percentage of income paid in all federal taxes combined— 
borne by the richest 1% will have declined by 18%. During this 
same period, the percentage of income that middle-income 
households pay in taxes is expected to increase from 19,5% to 
19,7%, 
Down at the economic bottom, something different was hap-
pening, tn 1977, a family of four at the poverty tine paid no fed-
eral income tax at atl and also received a tax credit that offset 
most of their social security payroll taxes, so their combined in-
come and tax liabilities came to only a little under 2% of their 
family income. By 1986, that same family was paying tO.5% of 
their income in income and payroll taxes, a sixfold increase. 
From 1977 to 1990, the mean income of the poorest fifth of 
families fell by 14% in constant dollars. Some have argued that 
this is due to the changing composition of households in the bot-
tom quintile, with a marked increase in the proportion of female-
headed households and the elderly. However, data from the 
House Committee on Ways and Means (8) indicate that, white 
there have been some demographic shifts, 43% of the increase in 
poverty between 1979 and 1989 was due to reductions in benefit 
programs at federal, state, and local levels, especially cuts in Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and in unemploy-
ment insurance. 
Thus, from 1970 to 1991, the maximum AFDC benefit for a 
family of three with no other income declined 42% in the typical 
state, after adjusting for inflation. The average vatue of AFDC 
and food stamps combined has fatten to about the same level as 
the value of AFDC benefits alone in 1960, before the food 
stamp program was created, tn 1972, a mother with two children 
who eamed wages equal to 75% of the poverty line would have 
been eligible for some AFDC assistance in 49 states. In 1980, 
she would still have been eligible in 42 states. By 1990, her fam-
ily could qualify for AFDC in only six states. The disposable in-
come (including after-tax eamings, AFDC, food stamps, and the 
eamed income credit) of a mother with two children who eamed 
wages equal to 75% of the poverty line was $3,100 tower in 
1990 than in 1972. tn New York City, holding household com-
position constant, the poverty rate for female-headed house-
holds increased from 41% in 1969 to 63% in 1987(14). 
Overall, Congressionat Budget Office statistics show that 
between 1979 and 1989, reductions in welfare programs like 
AFDC added 2.2 million people to the poverty rolls, while re-
ductions in social insurance programs like unemployment insur-
ance added nearly 1 million. Thus, during these years, the social 
safety net was being shredded and those at the bottom were fall-
ing through the gaping new holes. Almost every variety of pub-
lic program was reduced, dismanded, or effectively limited in 
scope by draconian eligibility requirements. In Texas, for exam-
ple, eligibility for Medicaid for a family of four is restricted to 
those with an income less than $2,200 per year, or about $ 1.50 a 
day per person for food, housing, clothing, and all the other 
costs of living (15). 
It is these cuts, as much as reductions in health care funding 
per se, and combined with recession and unemployment, that 
have put the homeless out on the streets and the sick poor into 
Any hope of truly reforming the American 
health care system is illusory without effecting 
a fundamental change in our overall national 
social, economic, and racial policies... We 
cannot, we will not, transform one part ofthat 
social contract in isolation from all the others, 
even a part as huge, as flawed, and as impor-
tant as health care without confronting the 
need for broader social change. 
the public hospital—or jail. The change in the social contract 
has created the conditions that so profoundly threaten the health 
of urban communities. 
The urban statistics on morbidity and mortality are frighten-
ing, txt me cite ju.st one poignant example involving children. 
The St. Louis Children's Hospital has reported a small epi-
demic (31 cases) of water intoxication—previously a rare condi-
tion—among poor infants over these last 15 years. All 31 infants 
lived in poverty and were fed excessive water; the most frequent 
reason was that their mothers ran low on formula and had to di-
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lute it or substitute water. Most of the cases occurred in the last 
three years, a time when previously available free sources of for-
mula disappeared (16). 
I cannot help but contrast these pattems of redistribution with 
the one attempt at redistribution to the poor—and the minorities 
who are suffering most—that was offered recently by the cur-
rent administration in Washington. The White House proposed 
to launch a new initiative against the highly visible and acutely 
embarrassing infant mortality rates in the inner cities—and to 
fund it by taking $54 million away from current community 
health center programs and matemal and child health block 
grants, major existing sources of protection against infant mor-
tality for the urban poor and the less visible rural areas. In other 
words, it is wrong to redistribute income but not to redistribute 
death. 
Race is used as an issue to divide populations that in reality 
have common interests and common suffering. Only one of ten 
poor children in 1989 was black and living in a female-headed 
household on welfare in a major city. More poor children live 
outside than inside big cities, and nearly two-thirds of all poor 
families have only one or two children. Also, a majority of poor 
families with children had at least one worker and a paycheck, 
not a welfare check, as the family's largest source of income. 
Poverty is not race-blind, but neither is it race-specific, and it 
does not match the stereotypic images presented to us repeat-
edly by the media. 
Race is frequentiy raised as an issue and coupled with an at-
tack on the old social contract. President Bush, in a recent 
speech, said the Great Society programs of the t960s, the em-
bodiment of a social contract invoking govemment responsibil-
ity, had discouraged individuals from becoming good workers, 
that the crusade against poverty had backfired, that civil rights 
programs had "generated animosity," and that welfare programs 
had made poor people dependent on govemment. The charge of 
failure, for obvious reasons, omitted any reference to the fotlow-
ing hugely beneficial and successful programs embodying that 
social contract; federal aid to elementary and secondary schools, 
Headstart, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act 
of 1968, Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the poor, the 
nationwide food stamp program, environmental laws, and the 
network of community health centers. Instead, the President 
suggested a "good society" in which individuals perform private 
acts of common decency and become "points of light." That so-
cial contract is called noblesse oblige, and it has left us with 
10,000 new points of blight. 
What has happened to us, as a nation, to account for this great 
change in our social orientation? One ofthe most perceptive and 
eloquent statements has come not from a political commentator 
but from a playwright and dramatist. Steven Tussich (17) wrote: 
"We are fleeing, as we have for decades, from the un-
fulfilled pledge that we are "one nation, under God, with 
liberty and justice for all.' The hopeless despair of our 
millions, the third-world poverty in the heart of our cities, 
the resulting tidal wave of crime, this social rot at our very 
heart, have become as dangerous as any nuclear waste 
dump. Lacking the resolve to confront these problems, we 
are fleeing from them in all directions: to the suburbs, to 
cities and other parts of the country, to other countries, to 
other wars, 
"But we have been doing this for a long time. The so-
cial diseases of racism, poverty, drug addiction and 
crime, never fully addressed, were allowed to fester or 
grow... the problems that took generations of neglect to 
create require the patient dedication of generations to 
undo. But we have become a nation that no longer seems 
to have the will, the vision or the deep-seated conviction 
to measure its endeavors by generations... 
"During the '80s, in a very violent way, the rich got 
richer, and in an even more violent way, the poor got 
poorer... We have now become that most worri.some of 
super-powers: isolationists in regard to problems at home 
and interventionists in regard to the problems of other na-
tions... We have come to rely on extemal enemies for 
comfort and confirmation of our identity as a people." 
And then, of course, we can claim that we are Number One. tt 
should be no surprise, then, as Dr. Seth Foldy (18) pointed out at 
Henry Ford Hospital's first Urban Health Care Symposium, that 
we are first in the world in narcotics addiction, first in handgun 
homicides, seventh in spending on public education, and 18th in 
reducing infant mortality. I would add another item; we are first 
in the world in the percent of our adult population in prison, sur-
passing even South Africa. 
Pessimism—and the picture I have drawn of the task that con-
fronts us is a gloomy one—is nevertheless no reason for inac-
tion. Let me offer, therefore, a modest suggestion for one health 
care reform and one account of a basis for optimism. 
The community health center movement was one of the im-
portant innovations of the 1960s in both urban and rural health 
care for the poor. Numerous, careful studies in the 1970s dem-
onstrated that such centers provided high-quality, accessible, 
and comprehensive care, lowered hospitalization rates and 
emergency room use, improved health status, and were highly 
cost-effective (19-22). There is a proposal in draft legislation in 
the Congress to quadruple their number—now approximately 
600 nationwide, serving some 6 million low-income people— 
over the next five years. The earlier studies strongly suggest that 
the costs of this expansion would be repaid rapidly in reduced 
hospitalization, in the reduction of the present burdens on both 
public and voluntary hospitals, in reduced infant mortality and 
disability rates, in increased immunization, and in early and ef-
fective treatment for substance abuse. 
However, there is a limitation: the desperate shortage of 
health personnel, especially physicians, willing to work in the 
inner city and in such settings. Community health centers are al-
ready close to crippled by personnel shortages. The latter-day 
structure of the National Health Service Corps and all of the 
quid-pro-quo state programs will still provide a scholarship or a 
loan to pay medical school tuitions on the promise that the recip-
ients will "pay back" with several years of service in medically 
underserved areas. But there is always a buy-out. tn New York, 
at least, with three such separate programs, the results are almost 
uniform; about 20% of all those in medical school who have re-
ceived such help eventually work in underserved areas; 50% to 
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60% buy out—go to the bank with their MD degrees and their 
residency requirements completed and negotiate a loan to repay 
the penalty for refusing such service. Another 20% to 30% are 
simply lost to follow-up. The system just does not work. 
The reasons are not just economic. I believe many physicians 
and other health personnel feel that by working in community 
health centers and other institutions in the inner city, they would 
be out of the mainstream of medicine, marginalized in low-
status jobs in difficult circumstances without social or profes-
sional support. 
There is a resource that we have not tapped; the professional 
societies—the American College of Physicians, the American 
Academy of Family Practice, the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, and the like. They could contribute to 
solving this problem by creating a category of special and real— 
not merely honorary—public service fellowship status for grad-
uating residents who choose to serve in inner cities and rural 
poverty areas. Such service could accrue special credit toward 
fellowship status in those professional societies. The societies 
could undertake to provide ongoing educational and other sup-
port—senior mentors, advice on simple health care and clinical 
series research, and participation in annual meetings for the 
usual two- or three-year duration of service. 
Ultimately, my contention is that we need a public interest/ 
public sector medical school in many of our major cities, uniting 
public universities, public hospitals, and health departments. 
Conventional medical education, with the best will in the world, 
is not interested in or committed to this kind of service. We need 
schools capable of providing special training appropriate to the 
needs and problems of the urban and rural poor, just as we have 
a Uniformed Services Medical School that provides special 
training for the needs of the military. 
Such schools could draw upon the vast reservoir of untapped 
human resources in the very populations we aim to serve. The 
medical school at which t teach, forexample, usually has 25% to 
35% black and Hispanic students. Most of the student body 
come from low-income families; many are the first in their fami-
lies to go to college, let alone medical school. Indeed, social 
class may be more important than ethnicity; we are creating the 
first working-class medical school since the Flexner Report. 
Recognizing these untapped resources has much to do with 
how we think about the poor and with what the poor think about 
themselves; the expectations they mount and the beliefs they 
hold about their futures. We are most often taught that the poor 
and their communities, rural or urban, are sinkholes of pathol-
ogy. The pathology is real, but these communities are also reser-
voirs of enormous (and unacknowledged) strength, resilience, 
and ability. We need an epidemiology of strengths, not merely 
of pathologies, to recognize that, 
I first became convinced of the reality of this reservoir of 
strength when I worked with colleagues in rural Mississippi, in 
what was then the third poorest county in the United States, in a 
health center that served a target area of some 500 square miles, 
with a population of 14,000 blacks and several thousand poor 
whites, with an annual family income (in 1966) of less than 
$900 per year, with a median educational level of fifth or sixth 
grade in miserably poor schools. As part of the health center pro-
gram, we launched a modest educational enterprise, taught by 
the center's professional staff at night; a high school equiva-
lency certificate program, and a college preparatory program for 
those who had a more complete education. We opened a small 
office of education at the health center to help end the isolation 
of this population from other institutions and to help them apply 
to colleges and professional schools and for financial aid—re-
sources that had been kept from these people by the prevailing 
social structure for many years. 
tn the first decade, from this poor county and the few sur-
rounding counties very much like it, that effort produced seven 
black physicians, five black PhDs, one person who has just com-
pleted a term as a state mental health commissioner, two full 
The community health center movement was 
one of the important innovations of the 1960s 
in both urban and rural health care for the 
poor. There is a proposal in draft legislation in 
the Congress to quadruple their number over 
the next five years. The costs of this expansion 
would be repaid rapidly in reduced hospitaliza-
tion, in the reduction ofthe present burdens on 
both public and voluntary hospitals, in reduced 
infant mortality and disability rates, in increased 
immunization, and in early and effective treat-
ment for substance abuse. 
professors at prestigious universities, more than 20 registered 
nurses, about a dozen social workers, and the first 12 black reg-
istered sanitarians in Mississippi's history. One young woman, 
a sharecropper's daughter with a ninth-grade education and six 
children who joined our staff as a trainer of aides at age 26, now 
holds my former job as Executive Director of the health cen-
ter—and she has a doctorate in sociat work and has put all ofher 
children through college. These data and anecdotes are a mea-
sure of the potential that exists in the populations we .serve. 
My argument, then, is that we have to do more than repair the 
health care system. We have to confront head-on the maldistri-
butions t have described. We have to work to redefine the social 
contract yet again. This is not an argument to postpone health 
care reform until these larger tasks are accomplished; on the 
contrary, we must try to use health care reform as an explicit and 
deliberate tool for reform in the social contract. 
Our task is illustrated by a true story, an experience that I 
found deeply moving. It serves as a metaphor for the attempts 
we have to undertake. In 1957, when t was a third-year medical 
student at the then Westem Reserve University, I seized the op-
portunity to go to what seemed to be the best department of so-
cial medicine then in the world—^of all places, in South Africa, 
at the one medical school then open to nonwhites. The depart-
ment ran two comprehensive teaching community health cen-
ters, one in a periurban African township near Durban, and the 
other in what was then called a rural Zulu tribal reserve of about 
500 square miles. I worked in both centers, and the experience 
changed my life. These were the models for the first two com-
munity health centers my colleagues and I later launched in the 
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United States, at the Columbia Point Housing Project in Boston 
and in Mound Bayou, Mississippi. 
A few years later, under Grand Apartheid, the South African 
centers were closed. Ten years later, the great social epidemiolo-
gist John Cassel, who had worked at Polela, the rural center, re-
tumed to see if there were any identifiable residual effects. He 
found only one; a continuing and increased level of educational 
aspiration and achievement in the population served by the 
health center. 
A few years ago, in connection with some of the work of the 
Committee for Health in Southem Africa, physicians from 
South Africa and from the African National Congress (ANC), in 
exile, came to an intemational workshop in New York. There I 
met Dr. Nkosasane Zuma, an ANC physician exiled in London. 
I asked her where in South Africa she was bom. "Polela," she 
said, and ultimately we calculated that she had been a child 
when t was there as a medical student. I asked her if it was true 
that the Polela health center had such an impact on educational 
aspiration. 
"Oh, yes," she said. "In the first generation, many people got 
educated and some were professionally trained as doctors and 
teachers and lawyers. In the next generation—mine—people 
got educated but also became politically militant and active. But 
this was true only for part ofthe tribal reserve. It happened ifyou 
were close to the health center, saw the role models, saw the in-
teractions among people of different races, saw what education 
meant in the lives of people. But you also had to live in the part 
of the reserve that was near the highway." 
That made no sense. "Why is that?" I asked. She said, "Be-
cause you really had to understand that there was a road out." 
tt seems to me that our task is to join with the people we serve 
in finding, creating, and demonstrating that there is a road out of 
poverty, rural or urban, a road out of racism, a road out of ineq-
uity, a change in the society that could follow in part from 
change in the health care system but without which such change 
will not take place. There is no more challenging or moving op-
portunity in our work. 
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